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"Works of the Law"

As for the argument that the "works of the law" applies to the ceremonial law, such that Paul is teaching that the ceremonial law cannot justify but that the moral law does justify, the first thing I would like to mention is that the Council of Trent, which is our central authoritative source on matters of Justification, NEVER used such argumentation. (Nor did they use anything close to Dunn's view, noted above). This fact becomes significant for our investigation, since during the Counter-Reformation there were certain Catholic clerics who, in opposition to the Lutherans, were trying to advance the argument that "works of the law" referred only to the ceremonial law. As it stands, the Council of Trent rejected that apologetic.

In the sixth session of the Council (where Justification is addressed), neither the words "ceremonial law," "ritual practices," nor anything of the sort are mentioned, not even one time. The only time the Council mentions the word "circumcision" is in Chapter 7 when it is quoting from Galatians 5:6 ("in Christ Jesus neither circumcision avails anything, nor uncircumcision, but faith, which worketh by charity"), but it gives no elaboration on the usage of the term. Again, this is significant because it shows us that the Council did not think the "works of the law = ceremonial law" argument was a good, or even biblical, argument to explain the nature of Justification.

Rather than focus on the ceremonial law, the Council of Trent went right to the main, overarching issue, that is, the issue concerning "grace versus works" that I mentioned above. In the very first Canon the Council says:

"If anyone shall say that man can be justified before God by his own works which are done either by his own natural powers, or through the teaching of the Law, and without divine grace through Christ Jesus: let him be anathema."

Notice that the Council's view of "works" includes ANY kind of work, whether the work stems from one's "own natural powers" or "through the teaching of the Law." In the Council's mind there is no distinction between "ceremonial" works and "moral" works, at least in regard to how a man is justified before God.

Thus, the Council's tactic is to make an immediate antithesis between "works" and "grace." In the remaining 32 Canons, the Council continues the same argument, never once trying to settle the issue by an appeal to the ceremonial law of Israel, or an antithesis between Jew and Gentile.

The Council twice mentions the "Jews," but in neither case does it make a dictinction between the ceremonial law and the moral law of the Jews. The two references are in Chapter 1 and 2 of the Sixth Session: (1. "not even the Jews by the very letter of the law of Moses were able to be liberated (from the power of the devil and of death"; 2. "that He might both redeem the Jews, who were under the Law").

Again, in Chapter 8, Trent states: "...and are, therefore, said to be justified gratuitously, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith, or works, merit the grace itself of justification; for, ‘if it is a grace, it is not now by reason of works; otherwise (as the same Apostle says) grace is no more grace' [Romans 11:6]." Obviously, if Trent includes "faith" as "none of those things" which can justify, then surely moral works are included in the "none."

Now one might argue that by these injunctions Trent was merely denying Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism. First, Trent never makes such a claim. In fact, the very foe they were fighting, Martin Luther, was the one accusing the Catholic Church of Pelagianism. Second, if Trent used some other kind of argumentation other than the one presented in Canon 1 and Chapter 8, namely, an argument that focused on the ceremonial law as the exclusive meaning of the "works of law," then the objection could be sustained. But such is not the case.

The point remains that Trent NEVER sought to answer the question of Justification by dissecting the Law into its constituent parts, i.e., ceremonial, moral or civil precepts. Although they had every opportunity to do so, the Council simply did not cite any verses from the New Testament that single out the ceremonial law. They only quoted from the NT passages which view the Law in its totality, since their main objective was to distinguish grace from law, not grace from ceremonies.

Logic dictates that if the ceremonial law apologetic was so crucial to the understanding of the issue of Justification (as some modern Catholic theologians claim) then Trent would have been REQUIRED to use it. They would have no right to ignore it in favor of a view which taught that the Law referred to the WHOLE law of Moses and Works referred to ANY work.

Now some might argue that the Council's focus was dictated by the particular arguments that the Reformers were advancing; and since this is not our concern today, nor was it the concern of Paul in the first century AD, then we are not obligated to use it. Let me say quite candidly, this is wrong.

First, as I noted above, the Council of Trent already ignored the "ceremonial law" argumentation which was being advanced by various Catholic clerics who were trying to answer the Lutherans.

Second, and this should come as no surprise to Catholics who know their history, the Fathers of the Church show quite clearly in their writings that there was a consensus of understanding that, in reference to how a man is justified, the words "works of the law," "works," or "law" referred to ANY work, ceremonial or moral.

Justin Martyr is sometimes used by those advocating that "works of the law" refer only to the ceremonial law. Certainly quotes such as the following may give that impression ("If circumcision was not necessary before Abraham, nor before Moses, the sabbath observance and festivals and sacrifices, then, similarly, they are not necessary now..." -- Dialogue with Trypho, 23). But when we compare this to another quote, we see that Justin had a much larger picture in mind ("I have read, Trypho, that there will be a final law, and a covenant the most authoritative of all, which must be observed by all men who seek after the inheritance of God. That law on Horeb is old, and was only for you; but this is for all in general. A law set down after another law abrogates that which was before it, and a covenant made later likewise voids the which was earlier" Dialogue with Trypho, 11). There is no doubt that Justin understood that the whole law was abrogated (ceremonial and moral), since Horeb was the place Israel received the whole Law (Deut 5:2f).

Origen is sometimes used, but we find the same out-of-context quotes being extractred. Moreover, Origen is simply not the most reliable witness due to his many heterodox theological ideas that were banned by the Church.

Undaunted, some apologists have cited the Didaskalia Apostolorum, which is purported to have been written by the Apostles, as being supportive of the "works of the law = ceremonial law" concept. But not only does this document not identify who the writer actually is, or its date of writing, it is not cited by any of the Fathers or Councils as holding any authority whatsoever. Moreover, it contains many questionable statements, and some that are totally opposite from what we find in the Council of Trent and the Catholic Catechism. For all intents and purposes, it is a spurious document without the slightest credibility. Even at that, its argument for the ceremonial law is not that strong.

Next we come to the great Fathers, Augustine and Jerome. It is said that Jerome also sided with the "works of the law = ceremonial law" apologetic. I have in the past accepted this on the word of those who purport such, but I must say that no one has yet produced the citation from Jerome where he indeed says so, nor have they shown where Jerome rejects the moral law as being included in the "works of the law" formula. Even if Jerome did take such a view, this would be somewhat out of place, since no contemporary of his would have agreed. Chief among them is St. Augustine.

Commenting on Romans 7 Augustine writes:

Although, therefore, the apostle seems to reprove and correct those who were being persuaded to be circumcised, in such terms as to designate by the word "law" circumcision itself and other similar legal observances, which are now rejected as shadows of a future substance by Christians who yet hold what those shadows figuratively promised; he at the same time, nevertheless, would have it to be clearly understood that the law, by which he says no man is justified, lies not merely in those sacramental [ceremonial] institutions which contained promissory figures, but also in those works by which whosoever has done them lives holily, and amongst which occurs this prohibition: "Thou shalt not covet."

Is it possible to contend that it is not the law which was written on those two tablets that the apostle describes as "the letter that killeth," but the law of circumcision and the other sacred rites which are now abolished? But then how can we think so, when in the law occurs this precept, "Thou shalt not covet," by which very commandment, notwithstanding it being holy, just, and good, "sin," says the apostle, "deceived me, and by it slew me"? What else can this be than "the letter" that "killeth"? (On the Spirit and the Letter, NPNF, vol. 5, p. 93).

Notice that Augustine is well aware of the temptation some have in saying that the "Law" refers only to the ceremonial law. To avoid this temptation, Augustine tells us that Paul "would have it clearly understood" that he does not wish to confine "Law" to the ceremonies. One of Augustine's proof texts is Romans 7:7, where Paul says that the Ninth and Tenth commandments, which are concerned with the sin of coveting, are representative of the entire Law that condemns men in sin and cannot be relied upon to justify him.

The significance of this is that the law against coveting is a MORAL law, not a ceremonial law. We must conclude, then, that if Paul is saying that the moral law condemns him in sin, and therefore does not justify him, then it is the moral law that cannot justify; and it is the moral law that must be set aside. Obviously, it is not just the ceremonial law which needs to be set aside.

Romans 7 is such an important passage in helping us understand the issue of Justification. Unfortunately, I find many Catholic apologists simply ignoring Romans 7; or if they do address it, they twist it out of its context to make it coincide with their preconceived concept that "law = ceremony," totally dismissing the fact that Paul says that the "law" which must be set aside in order for man to be saved includes the moral precepts of Old Covenant Israel.

Not only does Augustine tell us this about Paul, but St. Thomas Aquinas has the same interpretation. Unfortunately, those who are trying to support the idea that "works of the law = ceremonial law" fail to quote the places where Aquinas denies that teaching, and instead they concentrate on the places where Aquinas appears to say that the law refers to the ceremonial law.

It is true that in one place, Aquinas' interpretation of Galatians 2:16, he says that the "works of the law" refers mainly to the ceremonies, but this is only because the verses immediately prior are clearly focusing on that one aspect of the law (cf., Galatians 2:11-15). But when Aquinas comes to Galatians 3:10-12 he is very careful to say that the "Law" which Christ came to set aside so that man can be justified refers to the WHOLE Law of Israel, the ceremonial law and the moral law. Here's what he says:

"I answer that he is speaking here about keeping the commandments of the Law insofar as the Law consists of ceremonial precepts and moral precepts. This is the Law that is not of faith...Therefore, strictly speaking, he fulfills the command of faith who does not hope to obtain from it anything present and visible, but things invisible and eternal." (Commentary on Galatians 3:12; Aquinas Scripture Series, trans., F. R. Larcher, p. 83).

Galatians 3;10-12 is not the only place where Aquinas teaches that "works of the law' or "Law" in the New Testament refers to the whole law. In his commentary on Romans 3:20; 5:20; 7:6 and 2 Cor. 3:7 he says the same thing. Suffice it to say that in no place in his writings does Aquinas allow the idea of "works of the law = ceremonial law" to serve as the overriding concern in the analysis of how a man is justified. This is also true of the other prominent medieval theologians. I know of know one who used the "ceremonial law" apologetic.

Now we can see why the Council of Trent said what it did. The consensus of Church Fathers, including Augustine; the consensus of Medieval theologians, including Aquinas, made it quite clear that the "works of the law = ceremonial law" argumentation was at best a half-truth, and as such, it ended up distorting the Scripture's teaching on the important matter of Justification.

Lest anyone think that these views are from "traditional" Catholicism but that Catholics today have a deeper and better understanding on the issue of Justification, let me make it known that the 1992 Catholic Catechism takes the same approach as the Council of Trent. All the statements the Catechism gives on Justification (paragraphs 1987 through 2029) match, precept for precept, what the Catholic Church has traditionally taught on this subject. Not one time in those paragraphs does the 1992 Catechism use the argument that "works of the law" refer to the ceremonial law, to the exclusion of the moral law. Nor does the Catechism, when it is discussing the Law, make a distinction between the ceremonial and moral laws (paragraphs 1949 through 1986). Rather, everything I am teaching in this paper is taught in both the Council of Trent and the 1992 Catechism.

Let me also add the words of the Roman Catechism from the Council of Trent:

"But, lest the people, aware of the abrogation of the Mosaic Law, may imagine that the precepts of the Decalogue are no longer obligatory, it should be taught that when God gave the Law to Moses, He did not so much establish a new code, as render more luminous that divine light b which the depraved morals and long­continued perversity of man had at that time almost obscured. It is most certain that we are not bound to obey the Commandments because they were delivered by Moses, but because they are implanted in the hearts of all, and have been explained and confirmed by Christ our Lord. The reflection that God is the author of the law is highly useful, and exercises great influence in persuading (to its observance); for we cannot doubt His wisdom and justice, nor can we escape His infinite power and might. Hence, when by His Prophets He commands the law to be observed, He proclaims that He is the Lord God; and the Decalogue itself opens: I am the Lord thy God; and elsewhere (we read): If I am a master, where is my fear? That God has deigned to make clear to us His holy will on which depends our eternal salvation (is a consideration) which, besides animating the faithful to the observance of His Commandments, must call forth their gratitude Hence Scripture, in more passages than one, recalling this great blessing, admonishes the people to recognise their own dignity and the bounty of the Lord Thus in Deuteronomy it is said: This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations, that hearing all these precepts they may say: Behold a wise and understanding people, a great nation; again, in the Psalm (we read): He hath not done in like manner to every nation, and his judgments he hath not made manifest to them."

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