Catholic Apologetics International
Catholic Apologetics International
Catholic Apologetics International
home
e-pologetics
Articles
Dialogs
Q&A
Science
products
Books
Tapes
Conferences
services
Consulting
Bible Study
Greek Study
Seminars
about us
Staff
Employment
Links
sensus catholicus society
donations
miscellany
Divine Comedy
Quotable Quotes



Justification
Christiology
Mary & the Saints
Last Things
Sacraments
Pastoral
Bible/Sola Scriptura
Science



Print This Article
Should Women Wear Veils? Page 1
1 2 3

Mr. Colin Donovan, Vice-President of Theology at EWTN, was asked by a patron whether women were required to wear veils. Citing the 1983 Code of Canon Law as his source, Mr. Donovan denied that women are required to wear veils. A CAI patron forwarded Mr. Donovan's reply to us and asked if we would examine and critique Mr. Donovan's position. Robert Sungenis decided to give a lengthy rebuttal to Mr. Donovan, using the same 1983 Code of Canon Law that Mr. Donovan used. In the end, you will see that women should still wear veils, and the Church teaching on this has not changed, and never will change.

Robert,

Colin Donovan of EWTN answered a question regarding women wearing veils. He says they are not required to wear veils. I want to know if you think it is correct. Here is his answer below. Would you comment on it, please?

Thank you,

John

Colin Donovan: The 1917 Code of Canon Law. canon 1262, stated, 1. It is desirable that, consistent with ancient discipline, women be separated from men in church. 2. Men, in a church or outside a church, while they are assisting at sacred rites, shall be bear-headed, unless the approved mores of the people or peculiar circumstances of things determine otherwise; women, however, shall have a covered head and be modestly dressed, especially when they approach the table of the Lord. When the 1983 Code of Canon Law was promulgated this canon was not re-issued; indeed, canon 6 abrogated it, along with every other canon of the 1917 Code not intentionally incorporated into the new legislation. Thus, there is no longer any canonical obligation for women to wear a head-covering, much less the more specific veil.

R. Sungenis: Mr. Donovan is making a lot of assumptions without proof or evidence from Canon Law. For example, the 1983 Code of Canon Law says the following about previous Codes of Canon Law, namely, the 1917 code:

Canon 20: "A later law abrogates, or derogates, an earlier law if it states so expressly, is directly contrary to it, or completely reorders the entire matter of the earlier law. A universal law, however, in no way derogates from a particular or special law unless the law expressly provides otherwise."

So here we see that Canon Law puts limits around itself in relation to previous Canon Law. In other words, the 1983 Code does not automatically "abrogate" an earlier law unless it "states so expressly," makes a statement about that law which "is directly contrary to it," or "reorders the entire matter." None of these were done in the 1983 code regarding women wearing veils. Canon 21 adds even more force to Canon 20 as it says:

Canon 21: "In a case of doubt, the revocation of a pre-existing law is not presumed, but later laws must be related to the earlier ones and, insofar as possible, must be harmonized with them."

In other words, if the present code of law does not mention anything about veils, and thus causes doubt in one's mind, in that case, the 1983 code says no one can "presume" that the law requiring veils is not required. Instead, whatever the 1983 code says about women in general must be harmonized with the 1917 code.

Further, the 1983 code speaks of "Custom" as having the force of law. If wearing veils is considered a custom, then these canons apply.

First, Canon 27 says: "Custom is the best interpreter of laws." That is, if the custom of women wearing veils can be shown to be based in Tradition, and has been practiced and never rescinded in that Tradition, it is a custom that then must be used to interpret any code of canon law. Canon law is not an end in itself (contrary to what Mr. Donovan is assuming), but is to be "interpreted" in accordance with Tradition. According to canon law, Tradition does not suddenly disappear when a new code of canon law appears.

How powerful is "Custom" when deciding these issues? Again, the 1983 Code tells us. In Canon 24.2 it states: "A custom contrary to or beyond canon law cannot obtain the force of law unless it is reasonable; a custom which is expressly reprobated in the law, however, is not reasonable."

In other words, a "custom" is considered "reasonable" if it is not "expressly reprobated in the law." As long as it is "reasonable," the "custom" has the "force of law," even if it is "contrary to or beyond canon law." So if someone were to argue that the requirement for women to wear veils is "contrary to or beyond" the 1983 code of canon law, still, since the "custom" of wearing veils is well-established in Tradition, and is also "reasonable," then the 1983 code does not affect it.

Please note that, someone could claim that the 1983 code was "contrary to or beyond" women wearing veils only if the 1983 code specifically said something "contrary," to the effect of: "Women are not to wear veils," or something that claimed the veil-wearing was "beyond" canon law, such as "Women are not required to wear veils because we recognize no such tradition, custom, or previous canon law that stipulated such a requirement."

But in reality, no one can argue that veil-wearing is "contrary to or beyond" the 1983 code, not only because the 1983 makes no such concession, but also because veil-wearing was not only part of previous canon law, but it permeated the Tradition for over 1900 years, unless, of course, someone can show us in church history a universal practice in which women were not wearing veils.

Next, what does the 1983 code consider as a "custom" that can have the "force of law"? Canon 26 answers that question. It states: "Unless the competent legislator has specifically approved it, a custom contrary to the canon law now in force or one beyond a canonical law obtains the force of law only if it has been legitimately observed for thirty continuous and complete years"

Notice that, even if the "custom" were "contrary or beyond" present canon law (which veil wearing is not, since the 1983 code does not forbid veil-wearing), even then, if the "custom" has been practiced for "thirty (30) continuous and complete years" it is not affected by current canon law and "obtains the force of law." Ask yourself this question: Has veil-wearing for women been in practice for "thirty continuous years" prior to the 1983 code of canon law? Obviously, yes.

Notice this also in Canon 26: "Only a centenary or immemorial custom, however, can prevail against a canonical law which contains a clause prohibiting future customs."

A "centenary" custom is one that has been in practice for 100 years. An "immemorial" custom is one that has been practiced in the entire Tradition of the Church. Obviously, veil-wearing fulfills both these criteria. But, of course, this applies only if the 1983 code "prohibits" veil-wearing, which it does not. In effect, Canon 26 proves the case of veil-wearing so forcefully that it becomes impregnable.

Now note this stipulation in Canon 28 of the 1983 code: "...Unless it makes express mention of them, however, a law does not revoke centenary or immemorial customs, nor does a universal law revoke particular customs."

Here we see the same, and a little more, of what we saw in the previous canons. Canon 28 has reiterated the principle that, unless the code of 1983 "makes express mention of" veil-wearing, then a 1983 "law does not revoke centenary or immemorial customs." But note this also: not even a "universal law" can "revoke particular customs."

So, when in the 1983 code of Canon Law John Paul II says: "Therefore, in promulgating the Code today, I am full aware that this act is an expression of pontifical authority and therefore is invested with a primatial character" (page xxix), this means that, unless he decides to change it, John Paul II is bound by what he himself put in the 1983 code. That means he is bound to abide by the rule of "customs" as outlined in Canons 23-28, and therefore, no change from the "immemorial" custom of women wearing veils is, or has been, made by the Magisterium.

Now, what if someone were to argue from earlier canons in the 1983 code? Those canons are not going to help either, since they support the canons of Ecclesiastical Laws (Canons 20-21 we cited earlier) and the canons on Customs (Canons 23-28). For example, Canon 2 says:

"For the most part the Code does not define the rites which must be observed in celebrating liturgical actions. Therefore, liturgical laws in force until now retain their force unless one of them is contrary to the canons of the Code."

Here we see that the 1983 code is admitting that it hasn't "defined" many of the things that take place in "liturgical actions." If we understand veil-wearing as being related to "liturgical action" since it is practiced mainly during the liturgy (and since the previous code of 1917 put veil-wearing in a liturgical context), then it follows that, since veil-wearing is one of those "liturgical actions" which the 1983 code does not address, "therefore," the "law" of veil-wearing is "in force until now" and "retain[s] its force "unless...contrary to the canons of the code," which obviously it is not.

Let's look at Canon 5: "Universal or particular customs presently in force which are contrary to the prescripts of these canons and are reprobated by the canons of this Code are absolutely suppressed and are not permitted to revive in the future."

So, unless the 1983 code specifically "reprobates" veil-wearing, then it cannot be "suppressed," and it can be "revive[d] in the future," which is what we can do presently - revive it.

Canon 5 continues: "Other contrary customs are also considered suppressed unless the Code expressly provides otherwise or unless they are centenary or immemorial customs which can be tolerated if, in the judgment of the ordinary, they cannot be removed due to the circumstances of places and persons."

Even though, as we have seen before, this canon doesn't specifically apply (since veil-wearing, if someone wants to call it a "custom," is not a "contrary custom," but a traditional, scriptural and beneficial custom), still Canon 5 shows how secure from being suppressed veil-wearing really is, since even if it were "contrary," it is protected by the "centenary or immemorial customs" clause we saw in Canon 26 and 28.

Canon 5.2 then says: "Universal or particular customs beyond the law which are in force until now are preserved."

Again, if veil-wearing is considered a custom, and is also considered "beyond" the 1983 code because the 1983 code doesn't mention veil-wearing, then veil-wearing is "preserved."

Canon 6 says: "When this Code takes force, the following are abrogated: (1) the Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1917."

Now, this is relevant because Mr. Donovan says the following in his argument against women wearing veils:

"When the 1983 Code of Canon Law was promulgated this canon [1262 requiring women to wear veils] was not re-issued; indeed, canon 6 abrogated it, along with every other canon of the 1917 Code not intentionally incorporated into the new legislation. Thus, there is no longer any canonical obligation for women to wear a head-covering, much less the more specific veil."

First, we should point out that Canon 6 of the 1983 code does not say that it "abrogated it," that is Canon 1262 of the 1917 code which required veils. Rather, Canon 6 says that it abrogated the "Code of Canon Law promulgated in 1917." That is, as a matter of legal jurisdiction, no one can base legal or canonical decisions on the 1917 code any longer, for it has no legal force. But we are not arguing for veil-wearing based on a legal or canonical basis, but on a "custom" basis, and a "custom" that is not merely "thirty" years in the making, or even a "centenary" in the making, but is, in fact, "immemorial." The fact that veil-wearing became part of canon law does not mean that it is dependent on canon law for its existence or practice.

Granted, someone could possibly make a legal argument that, since no canon presently requires a women to wear veils then she is not legally obligated to wear one, but we have already seen in Canons 23-28 that "custom" can have "the force of law" even though it is not a law itself. If it has the "force" of law then it acts like a law even though it is not, in itself, a law. That is what Catholic tradition is all about. We don't need "laws" to show us the right thing to do; rather, we do the right thing because it is right, and Tradition and Scripture show us veil-wearing is right. The only ones who are arguing for women not to wear veils are those, like Mr. Donovan, who want to make a legalistic argument against the practice, but of course, that is akin to the Pharisees arguing with Jesus that it is not legal for the disciples to pick grains of wheat on the sabbath.

As I stated above, custom, in the Catholic Church, has the "force of law," and thus it is just as binding as any canon could be. The irony is that, if one wants to base his decision regarding veils on its legality, the 1983 code contains about a dozen "legal" canons stating that previous customs and practices, not forbidden by the new code and existent for thirty or more years, have in themselves the "force of law." In fact, if the custom is 100 years old or immemorial, it can actually have more force of law than a canonical law (Canon 26). With both Scripture and Tradition giving the custom of veil-wearing its force, there is no precedent for claiming that canon law abolished the requirement for veil-wearing.

Mr. Donovan: Moral Law: Many wonder, however, if given St. Paul's instructions in 1 Cor. 11 there is not a moral obligation to do so despite the revision of canon law. First of all, if that were true it would be a matter of faith and morals and the Church would not have abrogated this canon.

R. Sungenis: Here again we see Mr. Donovan make the same mistake of building on a premise he hasn't yet proven. We have seen that the 1983 code did not "abrogate this canon." As Canon 20 says: "A later law abrogates, or derogates from, an earlier law if it states so expressly, is directly contrary to it, or completely reorders the entire matter of the earlier law," and Canon 21 says: "In case of doubt, the revocation of a pre-existing law is not presumed, but later laws [1983 code] must be related to the earlier ones [1917 code] and, insofar as possible, must be harmonized with them."

Consequently, Mr. Donovan's attempt to pit canon law against 1 Corinthians 11's command for women to wear veils is misplaced. We already saw that Canon 2 says that the 1983 code itself admits that, "for the most part the Code does not define the rites which must be observed in celebrating liturgical actions." Thus, the Code gives itself an excuse for not addressing the issue of head covering, and thus it cannot be accused of eliminating an issue of "faith and morals" regarding 1 Corinthians 11. Obviously, although Canon Law strives to be comprehensive, by its own admission, it is not; otherwise, it would not have to be redone very often. If it fails to address an issue, then according to its very own canons, that does not mean that the issue is no longer a matter of necessity.

Mr. Donovan: Secondly, that it is not true is clear from the language of the canon, which conforms to the moral theology tradition of the church in matters of dress. Dress is a matter of custom. What is modest and becoming in one culture may not be in another. Modesty goes beyond the domain of sexuality. As St. Thomas Aquinas explains it concerns 4 things,

First, "the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by "humility." The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by "studiousness" which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly, whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like" [ST II-II q160, a2].

Dress, external behavior, mannerisms, etc. are signs of the person, and becomes so in the cultural context in which the person lives, and in which it indicates something to others. The Christian conforms to the culture in such matters, unless sin is intrinsically involved (dress intended, or which will have the general effect, to arouse the opposite sex). Modesty is humility in dress and mannerisms, an outward sign of the disposition of the inner man. By not standing out the Christian assumes a humble posture toward his neighbors.

R. Sungenis: First, Mr. Donovan's attempt to make head coverings a mere matter of "dress" or "modesty," is certainly off the mark. St. Paul certainly did not make such an exclusive argument in 1 Corinthians 11:1-16. Rather, St. Paul makes it quite clear that head coverings are to be worn due to one of the most basic paradigms of creation - that the man is in authority over the woman (1 Cor 11:3-5). A women's head covering symbolizes she is under authority. There is no subject, outside of Christ, that St. Paul and the New Testament addresses more comprehensively and in more detail than the issue of women being under the authority of man (1 Cor 11:1-16; 1 Cor 14:33-38; 1 Tim 2:11-15; Col. 3:18; Eph. 5:22-33; Tit. 2:5; 1 Peter 3:1-5). [Note: For those who have a question about Eph. 5:21, please consult my article "Mutual Submission of Spouses?" at www.catholicintl.com/epologetics/Mulieris_Dignitatem.asp]. In fact, Paul argues that a women's head covering is so important that it is worn "because of the angels."

1 2 3